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ARGUMENT 
Ms. Gibson argues that she was not an "at will" employee at the time of her termination, 
because a US West Employment Office transfer counselor, with apparent authority, promised 
Ms. Gibson that her employment would be governed by the contract between US West and its 
union. US West counters that it always intended Ms. Gibson to be an "at will" employee 
(apparently even while she was a union member working in bargained-for units). In making its 
arguments, US West mischaracterizes key evidence, fails to acknowledge disputed evidence, 
seeks inferences in its favor, and fails to apply Utah law regarding apparent authority to the facts 
of this case. To rectify these errors, Ms. Gibson files this Reply Brief. 
I. US WEST'S EVOLVING "INTENT" WAS NEVER COMMUNICATED TO MS. 
GIBSON. 
In large measure, this case will depend on whether the Court of Appeals follows US 
West's characterization of the facts. US West ignores evidence disputing its story and asks the 
Court to draw inferences in its favor. According to US West, it had long ago decided that all of 
its employees were "at will" employees, and it clearly communicated that information to Ms. 
Gibson. See Appellee's Brief at 8. But Ms. Gibson's evidence shows that US West had a large 
body of employees working under a union contract, including Ms. Gibson, that it told its non-
union workers that they would be treated as union employees, that it promised Ms. Gibson that 
the union contract would govern her employment when she moved to the non bargained-for 
security office, that it only revised in Code of Conduct after Ms. Gibson began her work in the 
Security Office, and that it never communicated its self-serving "at will" disclaimer language to 
Ms. Gibson. Appellant's Brief at 3-6. 
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A. THERE ARE MATERIAL DISPUTES AS TO WHETHER US WEST 
COMMUNICATED TO xMS. GIBSON ITS "INTENT" THAT MS. GIBSON 
WAS AN AT WILL EMPLOYEE. 
US West states that Ms. Gibson was familiar with the 1986 Code and reviewed it every 
year. Further, it boldly asserts that Mr. Gomez's supervisor reviewed the 1989 Code with her 
every year. Appellee's Brief at 8. While the 1986 Code was silent concerning an employee's 
status being "at will," the 1989 Code expressly includes this self serving disclaimer language. 
From this, US West then argues that Ms. Gibson's employment was "at will." However, Ms. 
Gibson denied she saw the 1989 Code and its self serving language until after her discharge. R. 
663-664. Further, she joined the Security Office in the spring of 1989 while the 1989 Code was 
published in August 1989. R. 002., R. 042, R. 165. 
Similarly, US West quotes from its Human Resource Guide and its "at will" disclaimer 
language. Appellee Brief at 8. There is no evidence that US West showed this document to any 
of its non-management employees, specifically including Ms. Gibson. R. 184. However, US 
West tries to resolve this problem in its evidence by noting that Ms. Gibson quoted from the 
Human Resource Guide in her brief. Appellee Brief at 19. Thus, US West asks the Court to 
infer that when her counsel used language from the Human Resource Guide against US West in 
Ms. Gibson's brief, that indicates that Ms. Gibson read the disclaimer language. Assuming that 
such an inference is logical and reasonable, in a motion for summary judgment, Utah law 
requires inferences to be taken in Ms. Gibson's favor, not against her interest. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, US West quotes from a handbook describing retirement benefits. Appellee's 
Brief at 8. That language provides that an employee's right to retirement benefits does not 
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preclude US West from terminating an employee with or without cause. Ms. Gibson's right to 
employment under the terms of the union contract is based on an express promise made to her, 
not the fact that she was entitled to any retirement benefits. As a result, this fact is irrelevant. 
Moreover, there is again no record evidence that US West ever communicated this information to 
Ms. Gibson. 
Thus, resolving disputed evidences and inferences in Ms. Gibson's favor, the Court 
should find that at the time US West promised Ms. Gibson that her employment in the Security 
Office would be governed by the union contract, US West's 1986 Code (with no "at will" 
disclaimer language) was in effect and that it did not at any time communicate the self serving 
disclaimer language in its 1989 Code or any other of its publications to Ms. Gibson. 
B. US WEST INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE ITS EMPLOYEES NOT TO 
JOIN ITS UNION SO THAT IT COULD TERMINATE THEM AT WILL, 
US West argues that it is impossible to conclude that US West intended anything other 
than at-will employment." Appellee's Brief at 20. Reasonable inferences from the disputed 
evidence refute this statement. Had the Security Office been a bargained-for unit, no one could 
dispute that Ms. Gibson's employment would have been governed by the union contract. 
However, US West faced and faces an obvious problem in keeping units non-bargained-for and 
its employees outside the umbrella of the union contract's protections. If the benefits available to 
union employees are better than non-union employees, more and more units will become 
bargained-for. In order to dissuade employees from voting to come under the union contract, US 
West developed a corporate culture that treated union and non-union employees alike. This 
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inference is not only supported by Ms. Gibson's testimony (R. 285-297), but the testimony of her 
managerial supervisor, Daniel Gomez, also supports this inference (R. 665). 
For this reason, until August of 1989, US West's "intent" that all of its employees were 
"at will" was not mentioned in its Code of Conduct. It was only with the 1989 Edition that US 
West clearly stated its "intent." However, that was after Ms. Gibson had received her promise 
and joined the Security Office. What happened in this case was that US West's Employment 
Office transfer counselor, trying to walk the fine line that US West had set, promised Ms. Gibson 
that her employment would be handled under the union contract. Ms. Gibson relied on that 
promise, made the transfer and now seeks to enforce the benefits of that promise. US West, still 
hoping that it is on the right side of that fine line, seeks to deny the benefits of that promise to 
Ms. Gibson. Ms. Gibson asks the Court to prevent this unfair result. 
II. THE FACTS SHOW THAT US WEST USED A SURPRISE ATTACK ON MS. 
GIBSON. 
Ms. Gibson complains that she was denied a fair hearing because of US West's surprise 
attack on the foundation and credibility of her testimony. While US West continues to deny that 
it attacked the foundation or credibility of Ms. Gibson's testimony, it also argues in contrast that 
it ''raised the issue" of her testimony in its initial and Reply Memoranda. Appellee Brief at 14 
and 28. 
At the hearing, US West argued: 
First of all, there is no foundation as to who made the statement. She simply says 
it was someone in the employment office of US West who made the statement. 
She didn't say who it was, whether it was a management employee, a secretary, or 
anyone else so there is no foundation, and if that kind of evidence were presented 
at the trial, it would not be admitted because it has insufficient foundation. 
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More importantly, the person who made the statement, there is no evidence in the 
record that that person had any authority to make the statement, and by making 
the statement alter the express intent of US West that employment was at wi l l . . . . 
R. 900-01. One will search in vain to find any argument concerning the foundation of Ms. 
Gibson's testimony or the failure to establish the transfer counselor's authority in either of US 
West's memoranda. US West only argued in its Reply Memorandum that notwithstanding her 
testimony, Ms. Gibson had still failed to meet the test for an implied contract articulated in 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol (an employee's understanding alone was insufficient). US West 
made no arguments about the foundation of Ms. Gibson's testimony or the failure to establish the 
authority of the person making the statement. Since Ms. Gibson's testimony concerned a 
promise made to her, not her understanding of company policy, there was no way to discern from 
US West's memoranda that it was attacking either the foundation of Ms. Gibson's testimony or 
that it was arguing the transfer counselor did not have authority to make the statement. 
III. US WEST ATTACKED MS. GIBSON'S CREDIBILITY. 
US West not only denies that it attacked Ms. Gibson's credibility, but even disparages 
Ms. Gibson for raising the issue. Appellee's Brief at 31-35. Even so, US West still cannot resist 
even now attacking Ms. Gibson's credibility. In its Appellee Brief, US West refers to the 
transfer counselor's promise as a "phantom statement." Appellee's Brief at 19. 
US West's attack on Ms. Gibson's credibility is subtle but pervasive. For instance, in 
describing the facts of this case, US West notes that Ms. Gibson had a telephone call with Ms. 
Mehl in the fall of 1990 and recognized who she was. Appellee Brief at 9-10. That fact has no 
relevancy except to attack the credibility of Ms. Gibson's testimony that her disclosure that a 
Brenda called the Security Office was inadvertent. Similarly, US West's points out that Ms. 
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Gibson's disclosed her belief that she had inadvertently compromised Ms. Mehl's trap and trace 
request in her second telephone call with Mr. Gomez. The only relevancy that fact has is to 
attack Ms. Gibson's credibility. 
Moreover, US West attempts to minimize the use of "supposedly" in relationship to its 
arguments concerning Ms. Gibson's testimony that the US West transfer counselor promised her 
that the union contract would govern her employment. Appellee Brief at 32. Rather than 
acknowledging that this constitutes an indirect attack on Ms. Gibson's credibility, US West 
suggests that the use of this word was its way of saying that Ms. Gibson had failed to establish 
the transfer counselor's authority to represent US West and its Employment Office. One 
wonders why US West would use a coded message (the word "supposedly" in quotation marks) 
rather than simply stating: "Ms. Gibson has failed to identify the authority of the US West 
employee who made the promise." 
US West's refusal to acknowledge that it has attacked, and continues to attack, Ms. 
Gibson's credibility does not change the fact that it has and does. 
IV. MS. GIBSON HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT US WEST'S 
EMPLOYMENT OFFICE TRANSFER COUNSELOR HAD APPARENT 
AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE PROMISE MADE TO MS. GIBSON. 
As explained in Ms. Gibson's Appellant's Brief, "[bjasic agency law dictates that a 
principal is bound by the acts of an agent clothed with apparent authority." Horrocks v. 
Westfalia Systemat, 802 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1995); Appellant's Brief at 12. Based on Larson v. 
Wycoff, 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981), US West argues that Ms. Gibson has failed to establish a 
factual basis for a finding of apparent authority. US West is mistaken. 
6 
In Larson, the plaintiff employee sued to recover medical payments. Pursuant to the 
contract between the employer and the insurance company, the plaintiff would be covered as a 
full-time employee, but not as a part-time employee. When the plaintiff changed assignments 
and became a part time employee, the insurance company did not initially withhold payments. 
However, it eventually did so. When that happened the employee sued. 
The employer published a handbook for its employees that explained the terms of the 
insurance contract. Upon becoming a full time employee, the plaintiff read the handbook and 
completed applications for medical benefits coverage. 
The plaintiff argued that the employer should be bound to continue his insurance 
coverage because, at the time he had changed assignments, his immediate supervisor, a work 
foreman, erroneously advised him that changing his assignments would not affect his insurance 
coverage. 
In this context, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that admissions of an officer of a 
corporation are not binding against the corporation "unless . . . made by the officer on behalf of 
the corporation . . . and within the scope of his authority." Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 802 
P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1995). Since the plaintiff had presented no facts that the work foreman was 
acting as an agent for the corporation and within the scope of his authority, the Supreme Court 
ruled there was no basis for a finding that the work foreman had apparent authority to make 
promises to the employee concerning insurance coverage issues. 
In contrast, Ms. Gibson has established that she went to the US West Employment Office 
to discuss the impact of her possible transfer, that the person she talked to worked in that office 
as a transfer counselor, that the promise made to Ms. Gibson was consistent with the statements 
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of others and US West's practices, and that her immediate supervisor collaborated the promise 
made. Although Ms. Gibson has never been able to identify the counselor by more than a first 
name, she has established a prima facie case directly and by inference that the person making the 
promise to her was acting as an agent of US West to resolve employment issues and that the 
promise made was within the scope of the authority of the transfer counselor's authority'. In 
essence, US West would require Ms. Gibson to establish that the transfer counselor had actual 
authority in order to prove that the transfer counselor had apparent authority. This is illogical 
and not the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Gibson presented sufficient facts for the trial court to find directly and by inference 
that a US West Employment Office transfer counselor, acting with apparent authority, promised 
Ms. Gibson that her employment would be governed by the union contract. Had the trial court 
given full weight to Ms. Gibson's testimony, given full weight to the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, and refused to permit US West improperly to attack the foundation and weight to be 
given Ms. Gibson's evidence, pursuant to the Johnson v. Morton Thiokol test, it should have 
ruled that Ms. Gibson had made a. prima facie case that US West "manifested its] intent" to Ms. 
Gibson and the manifestation was "sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision." 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 812 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). Under those circumstances, the 
trial court should have denied US West's Motion for Summary Judgment. To rectify this error, 
Ms. Gibson asks this Court to reverse the trial court's summary judgment and to remand this 
action for a trial on the merits. 
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Dated November 7, 1996. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Meredith Gibson 
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